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1 Introduction 
 Nowadays, more and more investors choose to be involved into shadow banking 
business, which have helped the development of shadow banking system. Since the 
financial crisis in 2008, majority of investors were afraid to traditional banking system, 
they realized that they should minimum their risk of investments, one way of the 
reducing risk is that making their variety of investments more various, they do not trust 
any single financial institutions any more, as a result, it is risk distribution. Finally, the 
shadow banking became a new popular way to invest or finance in both China and 
European Union. However, due to the lack of supervision of shadow banking system, 
the shadow banking system cruel grew, which would interference the original stable 
financial system if we would ignore the potential risks of shadow banking system and 
we would not make a better regulation system to control it.  
The goal of this thesis is the description and the analysis of potential risk and 
regulation of shadow banking system in China and European Union. 
In chapter 2, we will introduce the theoretical background of shadow banking 
system in generally. In contrast, there will be some comparison banking system between 
shadow banking system and traditional banking system. Also, there will be summarized 
introduction of shadow banking system in specifically, which includes operations, risks 
of shadow banking system and so on. 
In chapter 3, we will introduce some existing shadow banking system in both 
China and European Union, which will be more specific to help readers to know 
working of shadow banking system in China and European Union better. It mainly 
focuses on the developments, composition, characteristics, impacts and risks of shadow 
banking system in both selected countries. 
In chapter 4, there will be the analysis of potential risk and regulation of shadow 
banking system in China and European Union, which would help readers to get in touch 
the existing situation of shadow banking business in selected areas nowadays. 
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2 Theoretical background of the shadow banking system 
Shadowing banking system indicates that a group of non-banking financial 
intermediaries which can provide some financial services that are similar to traditional 
banks, but these shadow banks could escape from normal banking regulations. In order 
to specify the shadow banking system, we will introduce both traditional banking system 
and shadow banking system in this chapter. 
2.1 Traditional banking system 
Farlex Financial Dictionary (2012) points out that bank is the network of 
institutions and laws that provide variety of financial services. According to the 
categories compared with shadow banking system, we divided the traditional banking 
system into three species, which are central bank, commercial bank and specialized bank. 
2.1.1 Central bank 
Central bank is an institution which is established by the government, it is 
responsible for controlling the nation’s money supply, interest rate and regulation of 
financial system which mainly includes the  commercial banks and other savings 
institutions. The rest of functions of central banks are in the following: 
 executing the monetary policy, 
 setting up the official interest rate for their official currency, 
 as the government’s bank and others bankers’ bank, 
 administrating the country’s foreign exchange rate and gold reserves. 
Further expounds, central bank plays an important role in regulating the money 
supply which can stabilize the currency value; as others bankers’ bank, central bank can 
centralize the reserves of other banks and issue the loans the other banks to be the lenders 
of last resort; also, central bank is the constitutor and executor of monetary policy, 
meanwhile, it can act as an instrument which is used for intervening the economy, at the 
same time, central bank can provide the financial services for government, issue the 
government bonds on behalf of government, raise funds for government and represent 
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the government to join in variety of international financial organizations and participate 
various international financial activities. 
The main fundamental difference between central bank and other financial 
institutions is that the main operation of central bank is the policy creation, but the 
central bank serves for macroeconomic objectives of government, which is decided by 
the position and nature of central bank. 
2.1.2 Commercial bank 
Casu (2016) states that the commercial bank is major financial intermediary in 
any economy. It is the main supplier of credit to the household and corporate sector and 
operate the payments mechanism. Commercial bank is one type of bank to as a financial 
institution which is responsible for undertaking the role of credit intermediary through 
the deposits, loans, foreign exchange and savings. The main business scopes are 
absorbing the public deposits, issuing loans and bill discounting, further, the commercial 
bank do not have any right to issue currency generally. 
Commercial bank is different from central bank and specialized bank, it is a 
saving institution rather than investing institution, there are some fundamental functions 
about the commercial bank: adjusting economy, which indicates that the commercial 
bank can through their credit intermediary activities to transfer the funds shortage of 
various social sectors, meanwhile, it can realize the adjustment of economic structure, 
consumption to investment ratio and industrial structural under the monetary policy set 
by central bank and other national macroeconomic policy; credit creation, which states 
that commercial bank can issue the credit instrument and checks through the daily 
business activities, it can enlarge their own credit by exceeding their own capital and 
absorbing funds. 
2.1.3 Specialized bank 
Specialized bank refers to banks which have a specific business scope and 
provide specialized financial services. The emergence of specialized banks is the 
embodiment of social division of labor in the financial sector. One type of well-known 
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specialized banks is investment bank, which is specializing in long-term investment 
business. Although investment bank is called the bank, but it cannot handle any 
traditional business what the commercial bank generally does, also it is different from 
the trust company or the investment company. 
The fund sources of investment bank mainly rely on the bonds or stocks which 
are issued by themselves. The investment bank is not allowed to absorb any deposits, 
which is usually done by commercial bank. There are some main operations by 
investment banks: 
 underwriting the issuance of securities, 
 brokerage business, 
 self-operated business, which means that the investment bank uses their own 
funds to do securities transactions, 
  fee banking, which refers to counselor of mergers and acquisitions, securities 
economics research and other forms of financial advisory activities. 
2.2 Non-bank financial institution 
Non-bank financial institution (NBFI) refers to the financial institution which 
raises funds through some ways of issuing stocks and bonds, accepting credit 
commission, providing insurance and so on, then it uses all the funds which they raised 
to long-term investment. The most important deference between NBFI and bank is: 
 the NBFI cannot accept deposits,  
 equally important, NBFI does not have right to obtain a full banking license. 
European Economy Paper (2012) states that the NBFI play a crucial role in the 
build-up and transmission of risks leading up to the financial crisis. Therefore, the 
economic policy maker would like to obtain a better understanding of NBIF and their 
potential contribution to the systemic risk since the start of the financial crisis. 
Firstly, NBFI usually has structured products that include the securitization of 
product, which can derivate the product risk. There are some assets held by NBFI, for 
7 
 
example, various mortgage structured product, which tend to more risky than initial 
thought by the NBFI.  
Secondly, the NBFI commonly has high connection with the banks. This kind of 
connection can illustrate that the NBFI is able to transfer its own financial distress to the 
banks through the counterparty risk, which can lead to a financial distress on a whole 
financial system. 
Thirdly, some of the NBFI have a huge size. If one of the big NBFI would get 
bankrupt, which could lead a financial distress at the level of the whole financial system, 
based on this circumstance, the market investors may be irrational to estimate the extent 
of the financial distress of the market, as a consequence, this situation would lead to a 
whole financial crisis to the financial system. 
Further, Carmichael (2002) states that there are some basic types of non-bank 
financial institutions: 
Risk-pooling institutions: the most common form of existence is insurance 
company, which underwrite the economic risks associated with illness, death, damage 
and other risks of loss. 
Contractual saving institutions: it is also called as institutional investors, which 
could give individuals the opportunities to invest in a collective investment vehicles 
(CIV). 
Market maker: the most common form of existence is broker-dealer institution, 
which offer a buying and selling price, and promote the transaction of financial assets. 
Specialized sectorial financier: it usually provides a limited financial service to 
a specialized financial sectors, for example, real estate financier, leasing company and 
so on. 
Financial service provider: it includes brokers, management consultants, 
financial advisors and fee-for-service. 
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2.3 Innovation of financial instruments 
Mishkin (2013) states that the innovation of financial instruments illustrates that 
under the scope of the law, and the premise of liquidity and profit, the financial 
institution can flexible use and recompose the conditions of prices, interest rates, 
maturities, repayment methods and risk indexes to create new financial instruments to 
meet different needs of investors who have different levels and purposes, as a 
consequence, financial institutions can win investors’ favor through the service. In the 
banking industry, the financial innovation has turned out a large number of instruments 
which only are used to be payment tools to become a new financial instrument which 
has strong liquidity and realize the financing function. The development of financial 
instruments has also gradually weakened the traditional division between commercial 
banks and other financial instruments, which mean that the commercial banks can 
securitize their liabilities, and other financial instruments can also make their liabilities 
to own payment and financing functions, thereby increasing the efficiency of the capital 
utilization. In the securities industry, the innovations in financial instruments include 
the issuance of special purpose stocks and securities with different functions, which 
could greatly improve the speed and scale of financing. 
There are some motivations of innovation of financial instruments: 
 Risk transformation: in order to transfer the risk of price, there are existence of 
innovative instruments, which include currency and interest rate swaps, 
futures, options and so on. Through the operation of these instruments, traders 
can transfer the risks caused by changes in the price of interest rates, exchange 
rates, stock indexed and oil prices. Nowadays, the financial markets in various 
countries have become increasingly influential, such financial instruments 
have been more and more widely used. For the purpose of transferring credit 
risks, there are appearances of loan sales, asset securitization and insurance 
for weak credit guarantee. 
 Credit creation and credit growth: because of financial innovation, many 
innovative instruments have already functions of credit creation, such as junk 
bonds. Along with the development of information technology, investors can 
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be more easily to distinguish the size of investment risks. Some investors with 
a risk appetite are more willing to invest in long-term bonds with high returns 
and low credit ratings which are issued by small companies. Nowadays, the 
junk bonds have become an important part of the bond market, besides, some 
innovative instruments strengthen the credit of financial instruments mainly 
through the guarantees of real estate or assets that have not been used before, 
for example, the securities issued with a mortgage of real estate. Such financial 
instruments have huge innovation potential. 
 Strengthen the liquidity: in order to meet this kind of demand, there are a large 
number of financial innovation instruments have enhanced the monetary or 
transferability of financial assets, for instances, the convenience of issuing 
notes, securities with a sell option and so on, which have opened up the second 
trading market for securitization of instruments. Some innovative instrument 
has enabled the free flow of funds between money markets and capital markets. 
Besides, there are a large number of international capital do transnational 
operation through financial investment, which have also significantly 
contributed to the international flow of financial instruments. The 
enhancement of liquidity has both positive and negative impacts on the rapid 
development of global financial markets and the global financial crisis. 
2.3.1 Securitization 
Fabozzi (2008) refers to the increasing proportion of the securities business in 
the financial business, credit flowing bank loans turn to debt instruments that can be 
bought and sold. Securitization is a form of financing to issue tradable securities in 
support of specific portfolio or specific cash flow. For example, bank issues guarantee 
for residential buildings, automobiles and leases to issue mortgage securities for 
investors to buy; enterprise issue financial bonds to raise funds for direct financing. 
Due to a series of effects produced by securitization, there will be a profound 
change which be brought to the entire national economy and tremendous impact to exert 
on social and economic development. Its specific functions as follows: 
 Capital socialization effect: in the form of securitization of raising funds, which 
has formed an internal trend that the larger scale of financing, the more 
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dispersed of stocks. Due to the small nominal value of shares, the number of 
investors holding stock shares directly or indirectly in the society is increasing 
day by day. This shows that with the development of the securitization, the 
stock gradually dispersed among the members of the general public and the 
capital has become increasingly socialized. 
 Operating scale effect: it means that with the expansion of production capacity, 
there will be a trend of decreasing of unit cost. The expansion of production 
scale is based on the expansion of capital scale. 
 The survival of the fittest effect: securitization ha realized the mutual choice 
between investor and enterprises through the free transfer of capital securities. 
This mechanism of survival of the fittest has the dual function of eliminating 
out-of-pocket investors and out-of-business enterprises 
 Resource allocation effect: securitization of survival of the fittest mechanism 
will inevitably lead to the rational allocation of resources. Under the effect of 
the survival of the fittest effect, investors are always investing more capital 
into a promising industry because of their high added value and high return 
rate. Therefore, it is determined that there will be a larger amount of social 
capital will inevitably flow into emerging industry, which could be conducive 
to the adjustment and conversion of the national economic structure. 
2.3.2 Securitization products 
Fabozzi (2008) states that the securitized product can represent a complicated 
part of the fixed-income market. In the following, there will several main types of 
structured finance instruments. 
Asset-backed securities (ABS) are bonds or notes based on pools of assets, or 
collateralized by the cash flows from a specified pool of underlying assets. It has some 
advantages:  
 Attractive benefits: it usually has higher return based on same credit rating. 
 Higher credit rating: from the credit perspective, ABS is one of the safest 
investment vehicles. Also, it is similar to bonds, which will repay the principal 
and interest, but in addition, ABS has a protection of mortgage. 
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 Investment diversification: ABS market is a highly diversified market in terms 
of structure, returns, maturities and guarantees. 
 Expected cash flow: the stability and predictability of cash flows for many types 
of ABS are allocated well. 
 Low risky: as ABS is warranted by underlying assets, it provides a measure of 
protection against downgrade of ratings due to incident risk. 
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) is asset-backed securities the cash flows of 
which are backed by the principal and interest payments of a set of mortgage loans. 
MBS can be classified into three types: 
 Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS), which deal with residential 
homes, usually for single family. 
 Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) are for commercial real 
estate such as malls or office complexes. 
 Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) are securitizations of mortgage-
backed securities. 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) consolidate a group of fixed income 
assets such as high-yield debt or asset-backed securities into a pool, which is then 
divided into various tranches. 
CDOs can be classified into three types: 
 Collateralized bond obligations (CBOs) are CDOs backed primarily by 
corporate bonds. 
 Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) are CDOs backed primarily by leveraged 
bank loans. 
 Commercial real estate collateralized debt obligations (CRECDOs) are CDOs 
backed primarily by commercial real estate loans and bonds. 
Generally, there are three parties in a credit default swap (CDS) over-the-
counter (OTC) contract standardized by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), including the reference entity, the protection buyer, and the 
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protection seller. In simple terms, if the default event occurs before the maturity date, 
the protection seller should make the default payment to the protection buyer; in contrast, 
if there is no default before the maturity date, there is no need for the protection seller 
to make the default payment to the protection buyer. Moreover, the protection buyer is 
required to make a periodic premium payment as a compensation of the protection to 
the protection seller until default or maturity. 
2.4 Shadow banking system 
The shadow banking is a system refers to the non-banking financial 
intermediaries that the bank loans are processed into the securities and then traded in 
the capital markets. Although it is a non-banking institution and not regulated as other 
normal banks, it has the similar functions and services as the traditional commercial 
banks. 
The concept of the shadow banking system was put forward for the first time in 
2007 by Paul McCulley, who is the executive director of Pacific Investment 
Management Company. The shadow banking system, also named the parallel banking 
system, usually consists of securitization vehicles, investment banks, hedge funds, 
money market funds, mortgage companies, SIVs (Structured Investment Vehicles), etc. 
These non-banking components are financial institutions that hold a large number of 
securities, bonds, and complex financial instruments according to the leverage. While 
promoting the prosperity of the financial markets, the high level of the financial leverage 
caused by the shadow banking system has brought tremendous vulnerability to the entire 
financial system and the rapid development of it was considered one of primary drivers 
of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. 
Lemma (2016) states that the shadow banking system refers to the credit 
intermediary system which includes various relevant institutions and business activities, 
and it is free from the traditional banking supervision system and it may cause systemic 
risk and regulatory arbitrage. International monetary fund (2013) states that “shadow 
banks refers to many financial institutions that act like banks are not supervised like 
banks”. 
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“Economist Paul McCulley coined the term “shadow banking” in 2007, but 
credit has existed outside the banking system for centuries”.1 Shadow banking is not a 
new phenomenon, but the term only recently came into widespread use, and there is no 
single agreed definition. The Financial Stability Board (2013) broadly describes shadow 
banking as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular 
banking system”. The People’s Bank of China (2013) used a definition of shadow 
banking that seeks to take the particulars of their own “national situation into full 
account.” They defined “China’s shadow banking system as credit intermediation 
involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system” that serves to 
provide “liquidity and credit transformation” and “which could potentially” be a source 
of “systemic risk or regulatory arbitrage.” 
Federal Reserve Bank (2012) states that in the traditional banking system, banks 
usually act like an intermediation which is standing between the savers and borrowers. 
Commonly, the savers make deposits in banks due to the high levels of trust, which can 
be used by banks to create the loans to borrowers, savers furthermore obtain the equity 
and debt of the banks. This kind of lending can be concluded as direct lending. Relative 
to the direct lending, the shadow banks can act as credit intermediation which would 
provide savers with more information and risk economies of scale by reducing the costs 
involved in monitoring borrowers and by facilitating the investments to be a more 
diverse loan portfolio. 
Further, we can find out that the shadow banks have similar functions and similar 
risks to traditional banks, which are associated with maturity, credit and liquidity 
transformation. Then we know that the shadow banking is not only a single category, 
but also encompass a very broad range of heterogeneous activities. 
The following Fig 2.1 shows the change of China’s shadow banking sector which 
can help to get a quick view about Chinese shadow banking sector. (the data after 2015 
is not available).  
                                                 
1 Bloomberg QuickTake, 2018. Shadow Banking. [online database]. [cit 24.01.2018] Available 
from internet: https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/shadow-banking.  
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Fig 2.1 China’s shadow banking sector surges 
 
Source: Bloomberg QuickTake, 2018 
2.4.1 The role of banks in the shadow banking system 
FSB (Financial Stability Board) published Global Shadow Banking Monitoring 
Report 2016 in 10 May 2017 and the data up to end-2015 from 28 jurisdictions, 
representing over 80% of global GDP. It announced that OFI (Other Financial 
Intermediary) assets rose from $89 trillion in 2014 to $92 trillion in 2015 in 21 
jurisdictions and the euro area due to a combination of higher equity valuations and an 
increase in non-banking credit intermediation. The size of OFIs was equivalent to 
approximately 150% of total GDP at end-2015, exceeding the previous high-point of 
139% before the financial crisis. Loans extended by OFIs grew in 14 jurisdictions and 
the euro area since 2011. Moreover, the narrow measure of shadow banking, includes 
non-banking financial entity types considered by authorities involved in credit 
intermediation where financial stability risks from shadow banking may occur, 
increased the financial stability risks by 3.2% to $34 trillion in 2015 for the 27 
jurisdictions. 
G20 Data Gaps Initiative Phase II (2016-20) stated that “The G20 economies to 
enhance data collection on the shadow banking system by contributing to the FSB 
monitoring process, including through the provision of sectoral accounts data…”. The 
main purposes of FSB include monitoring trends outside of the banking sector, detecting 
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where the risks associated with the shadow banking may arise, and detecting adaptations 
and cross-border regulatory arbitrage. 
The following Fig 2.2 shows the roles of different financial institutions in 
shadow business, which can be used to summarize how the shadow business works in 
general. 
Fig 2.2 The roles in shadow business 
 
Source: Lemma (2016), Page 81. 
2.4.2 Shadow banking operations 
The main purpose of the shadow banking operations is to create securities, which 
support the circulation of the capital, from the surplus units to the deficit units. The 
shadow banking operations can be considered a series process of shadow credit 
intermediation and usually include a large number of affairs associated with specific 
purposes, such as the credit enhancement and the maturity transformation. 
The shadow banking system is somehow similar with the traditional banking 
since shadow banks also provide the credit and increase the liquidity of the financial 
sectors. However, what makes the shadow banking system different from the traditional 
banking is that the shadow credit intermediation does not occur in an integrated way 
within a sole intermediary, while all stages in the traditional banking are achieved under 
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a single entity. Fig 2.3 below summarizes how the loans are transformed from the 
beginning to the end, namely from the real economy to the financial securities, under a 
legal framework, which are loan, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), asset-backed 
security (ABS) and Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
Fig 2.3 Shadow credit intermediation process and regulated activities. 
 
Source: Lemma (2016). 
Furthermore, in order to fulfill the requirement of controlling of the shadow 
credit intermediation process and ensuring the well-functions, it is necessary to establish 
the externalities produced by the shadow banking system, which can be managed by the 
interventions, in the worldwide financial system. Besides, it is important to verify the 
transparency of economic conditions and the symmetry in the distribution of benefits. 
2.4.3 Shadow banking risks 
As well as the traditional banking, the shadow banking system is faced with risks. 
There are two types of risks: one is coinciding with the instabilities of the entities in the 
shadow banking system; and the another is associated with the shadow banking 
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operations, namely the unsustainable use of the financial leverage, the unsound financial 
practices within the credit transformation, and so on. 
Lemma (2016) state that due to the current regulation of the traditional banking 
industry, which can be used to deduce that the points of concentrating on risks for banks 
are that the need to understand whether the traditional rules suit the shadow banking 
system. Specifically, it should be noted that there is a growing attention being paid to 
risks which are taken by banks, it corresponds to a significant system of guarantee, 
preordained to balance the negative effects of management events. Also, undoubtedly, 
there are some similar problems relative to traditional banking industry, which occur in 
the shadow banking system. However, it could be determined that these various risks 
might be amplified in the shadows, due to the limited knowledge of some conditions in 
process of operations. There is one point which people should be aware that in sufficient 
levels of transparency and the complications in the transportation of information which 
could result to conditions of uncertainty, it is unable to preserve the system from 
matching the competitive equilibrium necessary to ensure the maximized social welfare, 
at the same time, it also used to prevent the unjustified individual extra profits. 
There will be a table about the areas of risk in the following: 
Tab 2.1 Areas of risk 
 
Source: Lemma (2016). 
Also, there are a lot of risk factors which could measure the size of risk in shadow 
banking system, meanwhile, there should be various risk assessments in the following 
as table 2.2:  
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Tab 2.2 Rik assessment 
 
Sources: Lemma, 2016 
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3 The shadow banking system in European Union and 
China 
Nowadays, there is expansion of shadow bank in both European Union and 
China, due to the different national conditions, which would lead to a different situation 
of shadow banking system in European Union and China. In this chapter, there will be 
a comparison between shadow banking system in European Union and China to 
introduce the existing situation in both European Union and China. 
3.1 The shadow banking system in China 
Nowadays, the shadow banking system have become an important role in China, 
which developed quickly in recent years. Due to the different national conditions, 
Chinese shadow banking system looks like more different with other countries’ shadow 
banking system, in the following, there will be specific information to help know it 
better. 
3.1.1 The special definition of shadow banking system in 
China 
Because of different national conditions, China is a socialist country, which is 
differen with other western countries that are capitalist countriess, for example, the 
Europe, China has its own definition in allusion to shadow banking system. 
China's definition of shadow banking is different from that of some developed 
countries. In 2010, Xiaochuan Zhou2 pointed out that China's shadow banking mainly 
depends on traditional banking. In 2012, the Survey and Statistics Department of the 
People's Bank of China made a preliminary definition of China's shadow banking in the 
article entitled "Connotation and Denotation of Shadow Banking": An entity or quasi-
entity that is engaged in financial intermediation and has similar credit, maturity or 
                                                 
2 Governor of People’s Bank of China. 
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liquidity conversion functions as a traditional bank but is not subject to Basel III or 
equivalent regulatory status. A clear official definition appeared in the "Notice of the 
General Office of the State Council on Strengthening Supervision over Shadow Banks" 
(Guo Ban Fa [2013] No.107), which stipulates that China's shadow banking mainly 
includes three categories: First, there are financial intermediaries that do not hold 
financial licenses and are completely unsupervised, which include new online banking 
companies and third-party financial institutions; second, credit intermediaries that do 
not hold financial licenses and that lack regulatory oversight include financing guarantee 
companies, Small loan companies and so on; third, institutions hold financial licenses 
but they have under-regulated or circumvented regulatory businesses, including money 
market funds, asset securitization and some wealth management businesses. However, 
this definition from the regulatory perspective of the institution does not reflect the 
overall situation of the domestic shadow banking.  
China's shadow banking institutions mainly include non-bank financial 
institutions such as trusts, brokerages, funds and subsidiaries, guarantee companies, 
small loan companies and peer to peer (P2P) lending platforms; business products 
include trust plans, trust beneficiaries, and repurchase of bills , interbank payment, 
outsourcing investment, asset management plan, interbank wealth management, bank 
off-balance sheet wealth management, bill discounting, trust loan, credit assets transfer, 
entrusted loan, small loan company loan, peer to peer (P2P) network loan, etc. 
The operation of the mainstream shadow banking business involves the issuance 
of wealth management products by banks or the raising of funds through inter-bank 
liabilities (including issuance of interbank certificates of deposit), the transfer of trust 
beneficiary rights through the channels of non-bank financial institutions such as trusts, 
brokers and funds, the targeted asset management plan for brokerages, Specific asset 
management business, or other banks as the channel for the dual acquisition of credit 
assets, the purchase and sale of negotiable instruments, interbank payment business, the 
final funds to trust loans, entrusted loans, uncollectible bank acceptances and other 
forms provided to the real business Or make other investments. There are also a few 
shadow banks (small loan companies, P2P lending platforms, etc.) that limit lending by 
breaking the regulatory barrier with crowdfunding, P2P and other forms of Internet 
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finance. In this way, non-bank financial institutions that do not qualify for deposits and 
loans to become the shadow banking system chain and exercise the essence of deposits 
and loans and break through the corresponding regulatory. The huge banking system 
continuously innovates its business to chase higher profits in the environment of 
financial repression and regulatory constraints, and conducts regulatory arbitrage with 
other financial institutions attached to the banking system. As a result, the shadow 
banking business in China is essentially a loan-like business. China Shadow Bank did 
not form a complete credit chain between various agencies and businesses. Instead, it 
acts as a bank shadow and forms a complementary relationship with traditional banks. 
3.1.2 The development of shadow banking system in China 
Xu Yang (2012)3 state that in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, various 
countries injected a large amount of liquidity into the market to stimulate the economy. 
As a result, the global liquidity flooded and the currency surged in the traditional 
banking industry. The rapid growth and high yield of China's shadow banking has 
attracted the participation of many non-bank financial institutions such as trust 
companies, securities companies, asset management companies, financial companies, 
financial leasing companies and financial asset management companies. Due to the high 
deposit reserve ratio and the impact of interest rate control, the expansion of credit of 
traditional banks have been affected. In order to obtain higher profits, the traditional 
banks rely on the cooperation with shadow banking to get rewards. 
China's financial control led to the weakening of the intermediary function to 
traditional banks which could turn the deposits to investment. The financial 
disintermediation tended to aggravate and the shadow banking expanded continuously. 
In the first half of 2011, monetary policy did not significantly tighten. However, due to 
the diversion of funds from shadow banking, many funds of banking industry flowed to 
local governments, the real estate industry and large state-owned enterprises. Small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) obviously felt the credit crunch. While the funds of 
                                                 
3 Xu Yang (2012), the development and impact of shadow banking system in China, availiable 
only in Chinese, was published in 2012. 
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banking system were getting tighter, there were a great deal of speculative funds pursued 
high returns, which were flooding the market. Driven by the speculative atmosphere in 
the whole society, many enterprises are interested in industrial investment, they invested 
funds in financing and starts the financial business. State-owned enterprises would also 
use their advantages to obtain funds for "entrusted loans." 
China's strict market access restrictions have underdeveloped Chinese financial 
institutions. Regulated and under-determined market interest rates (especially deposit 
interest rates) have led to the substitution of China's financial development, which 
means that there was a substitution of informal finance for formal finance. Strict 
financial controls have allowed informal finance to grow rapidly with new demands in 
the new era. The rapid growth of more and more non-bank financial institutions 
provided the possibility for the growth of shadow banking in China. Some financial 
institutions which had similar business and related businesses with banks gradually grew 
and developed, which lead to a result that they gradually became capable of providing 
funds. That is the start of shadow banking system in China. 
 There is a typical financial system which is bank-led indirect financing in China. 
Over the past 30 years since the reform and opening up, indirect financing dominated 
by bank loans has accounted for 89% of the total social financing. However, with the 
rapid development of global financial markets and deepening of finance, profound 
changes have taken place in the financing pattern since the beginning of the new century. 
The proportion of financing scale of banking institutions in total social financing has 
been gradually declining. The control of the monetary policy of the Central Bank was 
also gradually realized by controlling the credit scale. However, with the advent of 
financial disintermediation and a large amount of off-balance-sheet assets in recent 
years, shadow banking has developed rapidly, which lead to a new phenomenon that the 
amount of credit growth in the balance sheet could no longer completely reflect the 
funding and demand situation of the entire society. Rapid expansion of total financial 
volume, diversified financial structure, continuous innovation of financial products and 
financing tools, commercial banks' off-balance sheet business had showed obvious 
substitution effect on loans, in addition to the rapid development of other financing 
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methods, which result to the functions of bank loans in economic development had 
gradual changed. 
Since 2011, as Chinese government had tightened their monetary policies, banks 
had begun to reduce their credit exposure. In addition, the capital needs of the still-
thriving real economy were hard to be met. Real estate and local infrastructure 
construction need more funds. Under the favorable expectation of a short-term prospect, 
the real estate industry with a predominant national economy has stepped up the fight 
for funds, pushed up already-rising interest rates and further increased the difficulty of 
obtaining loans for private enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
These kinds of vulnerable enterprises resorted only to the informal banking, which were 
shadow banks, as a result, it led the further rising and growth of shadow banking in 
China. 
At the same time, in order to circumvent the credit control of the central bank, 
some financial institutions shifted their credit business to off-balance-sheet businesses 
to financial markets, which could help them to escape from the financial regulation, and 
in addition to the high negative inflation rate, resulting in negative interest rates, a 
considerable number of residents and enterprises were reluctant to keep depositing 
money in banks. Instead, they were reducing bank savings deposits and placing more 
funds in bank financing, fund investment, insurance policies and private lending. Thus 
there is a start of forming a financial disintermediation. In summarize, the control of 
interest rates in China was an important reason for stimulation growth of shadow 
banking.  Hanny Sander (2011)4 states that due to the low interest rates of bank deposits, 
the number of entrepreneurs and other affluent individuals with excessive savings is 
steadily increasing. When the actual deposit rate is negative, they do not intend to put 
money into the bank but instead invest it through informal channels to charge 20% to 
30% interest annually. 
                                                 
4 Hanny Sander, China’s shadow bank, a report from Financial Times, published in 8th April 
2011. 
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The fundamental reason for the emergence of China's shadow banking is that the 
strict financial control from the Chinese government had led to the failure of the formal 
finance, especially the traditional ones, to meet the needs of the real economy. Therefore, 
the informal banking sector, shadow banking, fills the financial market gap. At the same 
time, bank savers and other funding providers are reluctant to accept very low (even 
negative) real interest rates and to transfer bank deposits to financial products such as 
wealth management, funds, trusts, insurance, private lending, etc., for higher yields to 
provide the necessary funds for shadow banks. Meanwhile, the development of a large 
number of non-financial institution has played boost role, also, more and more financial 
institutions are pouring into the shadow of banks. 
3.1.3 The composition of shadow banking system in China 
There are various participants in shadow banking system in China, there will be 
four mainly participants to be introduced. 
Endogenous shadow banks from commercial banks. At the present stage, 
China's commercial banks still hold the dominant position in the financial markets. The 
huge commercial banking system can provide abundant customer resources for other 
shadow banking departments such as hedge funds, trusts, money market funds and 
guarantee companies. Take the recent rise of bank financial products as an example. The 
underlying assets of such wealth management products can be loans, bank acceptances, 
corporate receivables rights and other asset portfolios. Commercial banks cannot use 
their own funds to transfer their risks to the trust product promoters and investors. And 
trust assets belong to off-balance-sheet assets, so that commercial banks can bypass 
supervision, which could lend funds to target customers who cannot get loans due to 
legal policy and other reasons. In summary, commercial banks can be said to obtain a 
lot of benefits in cooperation. 
Non-banking financial institutions. This part of the financial institutions 
mainly includes trust and investment companies, small loan companies, financial 
leasing companies, financial consumer companies, corporate finance companies, 
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financial auto companies and so on. This type of company has developed rapidly in 
recent years and some of them has been incorporated into the regulatory system. 
Non-financial institutions approved by government. For example, pawnshops, 
guarantee companies, youth mutual aid and entrepreneurial credit belong to this 
category. Such agencies have a more detailed division of functions and can coordinate 
some resources to support specific clients. Due to the increasing demand for financial 
markets, these types of institutions have also rapidly grown in recent years. 
Private lending and underground banking. In recent years, with the rising 
interest of banks, the tightening of credit and the suppression of the housing market, 
private lending is showing explosive growth. According to the "China Private Lending 
Analysis" published by China International Capital Corporation in October 2015, it is 
estimated that the balance of private lending in China has reached 13.8 trillion yuan, 
accounting for about 33% of the total size of China's shadow banking loans, equivalent 
to the total bank loans 7%. 
Tab 3.1 Asset size (trillion RMB) 
Source: Wind Information Co., Ltd (2017) 
From tab 3.1, we can easily conclude that the development of shadow banking 
system has been expanded greatly from 2006 to 2016, meanwhile, the gap of asset size 
between shadow banking and banking industry has been diminished in this period, 
which can be used to conclude that the shadow banking has been an important member 
in banking industry in China. 
Shadow banking Banking industry 
26 
 
Tab 3.2 The estimated scale of shadow banking in China (billion RMB) 
 
2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
The bank's non-
traditional credit 
business 
Entrust loans 3.64 4.41 5.17 7.22 9.33 10.93 13.20 
Undiscounted bankers' 
acceptances 4.13 5.15 6.21 7.00 6.87 5.85 3.90 
Non-bank financial 
institutions asset 
management business 
Fund trust balance 2.67 3.82 5.83 9.25 12.02 14.33 15.91 
The scale of the assets 
management business by the 
securities firm 
 0.28 1.89 5.20 7.96 11.88 17.82 
Fund company asset 
management business scale  2.19 3.62 4.22 5.88 12.60 16.89 
Insurance asset management 
business scale 2.97 3.52 4.05 4.97 6.06 7.72 10.06 
Other financing 
businesses 
Finance company loan 0.70 0.81 0.93 1.08 1.27 1.47 1.86 
P2P network loans 0.35 0.39 0.66 0.86 1.30 1.73 2.04 
small-loan company     0.06 0.23 0.62 
Financial lease  0.31 0.51 0.73 0.89 0.95 0.93 
Financing guarantee 0.99 1.65 1.90 2.22 2.34 2.20 2.20 
Shadow banking 15.45 22.54 0.77 43.72 57.72 78.47 95.94 
Traditional banking 0.04 104.93 4.22 43.99 64.60 187.32 216.19 
Source: own calculations. 
Years 
Main types 
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From the tab 3.2 above, from 2010 to 2016, the average compounded annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of non-traditional credit assets of banks was 11.9%, and the 
average compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of assets managed by non-bank 
financial institutions was 43.6%. The average compounded annual growth rate (CAGRs) 
of other financing businesses corresponding to the size of assets at 20.8%, during which 
time the rapid growth in the business of non-bank financial institutions contributed the 
most to the expansion of shadow banking. In 2016, the non-bank financial institutions 
accounted for 74.2% of the total assets under management, the non-traditional credit 
assets of banks accounted for 17.8% of the total assets and other financing assets 
accounted for 8% of the total assets. 
3.1.4 The characteristics and impact of shadow banking 
system in China 
There are two main features of shadow banking system in China. 
Direct financing as main function. Unlike the types of financial transactions in 
the Western shadow banking system, the shadow banking system in China is based on 
direct financing. Since the development of the financial market system started relatively 
late in China and it is still in its infancy, financial innovation products are few and 
standardized securitization channels have not yet been formed. Therefore, China's 
shadow banks mainly serve the real economy, and together with the financing and equity 
financing of commercial banks to solve the real economy and the efficiency of the 
supply of funds. 
Financial instruments are relatively single. As China's investment banking 
and investment funds are relatively backward, China's shadow banking has fewer types 
of financial instruments and a simpler design. At this stage, the shadow bank mainly 
focuses on financial products. Other examples include mortgage loans and credit 
facilities of small loan companies Loans and so on. Its leverage is not as high as US 
financial derivatives. 
Also, there are two main impacts of shadow banking system in China. 
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Interest rates more market-oriented. Interest rate of China’s bank is 
determined by the central bank, which can be only adjusted slightly, the overall of it 
cannot change. However, shadow banks are exempt from the interest rates set by the 
central bank and the lending rates are relatively free. Generally, the enterprises which 
are looking for shadow bank loans, they cannot get loans from the normal commercial 
banks, so the risk of lending loans to these kind of enterprises is slightly higher, as a 
result the interest rate will be slightly higher. On account of the shadow banking, there 
was a large loans of slightly higher interest rates in China and interest rates were more 
market-oriented. 
Increase the risk of the financial system. The traditional bank's internal 
management system is well established and its risk review is rigorous, also, the 
externalities are also supervised by the Chinese banking regulatory commission (CBRC), 
which is generally safe. The shadow banking system has a relatively short history of 
development, some things are not established well yet, the system of institutions may 
not be perfect, and the external supervision is very weak, more like "brutal growth." The 
specific risks of shadow banking are not accurate, but they are surely riskier than those 
of traditional banks. If the shadow banking problems go down on a large scale, they may 
spread to other areas of the financial system. 
3.1.5 Risk of shadow banking system in China 
Compared to other countries, China's supervision of commercial banks is more 
stringent. High deposit reserve ratio and strict control of loan quotas make the efficiency 
of bank allocation of funds decreased and increased costs. As a result, funds are 
motivated to avoid banks and appear so-called financial disintermediation. The banks 
themselves also have the incentive to package their loans as financial products, also, the 
cooperation within banks and trust, in addition to other forms of cooperation weakened 
their supervision to become part of the shadow banking sector. At present, China's 
shadow banks are mainly concentrated in the areas of off-balance sheet assets (wealth 
management products and entrusted loans) and non-bank financial institutions (such as 
trust companies) of commercial banks. Overall, shadow banking has three major risks. 
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Shadow banking risks shifting to the government. In the shadow banking 
development process, savers have gained higher profits, lenders have received financial 
support, financial intermediaries, which includes commercial banks that they also 
charge spreads and fees, earn profits, and the government may become the biggest loser 
in process. Shadow banking has a central role similar to that of traditional banks, but at 
the same time they are lack of direct liquidity support and deposit insurance mechanisms 
like central bank and they are vulnerable to run-away impressions. Therefore, the 
shadow bank's overall risk eventually passed on to the government body, leaving the 
crisis which will inevitably require the government to pay. 
Shadow banking brings wrong pricing risk to the market. At the micro level, 
shadow banks enjoy implicit deposit guarantees that provide yields which could appear 
to be risk-free for savers. In this way, more and more profitable but less risky products 
are introduced into the financial markets, creating a strong attraction for funds. As a 
result, those low-risk, low-yielding assets may not be able to give a higher "risk-free 
rate of return", which could lead them be disable to attract funds. Misallocation of 
resources caused by the disorder of the price system may directly affect the development 
of the real economy. In practice, some shadow banks have disrupted macro-control to 
some extent in the industries and fields where the formal banks cannot issue loans by 
investing funds in local government financing platforms, real estate, and some industries 
or fields which belong to high pollution, high energy consumption, or overcapacity, etc., 
to a certain extent, affecting the pace of adjustment of economy structure. 
Shadow banking itself has operational risk and liquidity risk. Relative to the 
formal loan approval process of mature bank, the shadow bank's fund utilization does 
not have a complete and strict system to follow. It does not rule out the introduction of 
more risks or even illegal acts during the operation due to human reasons. In particular, 
some shadow lenders with financing functions, such as small loan companies, 
pawnshops and financing guarantee companies, which are blindly expanding and are 
prone to over-run and get other problems. On the other hand, many shadow banking 
products and their own designs are inherently flawed. For example, there is a clear 
liquidity risk in the trust company's pooling business and some long-term infrastructure 
investment reliance on short-term trust financing. As a result, shadow banking risks 
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have largely accumulated outside the regulator's view, once it happens, which would 
lead more destructive influence than the visible risk does. 
3.2 The shadow banking system in European Union 
Similar to China, the shadow banking system has developed quickly in European 
Union recent years. Moreover, it has some differences with shadow banking system in 
China, in the following, there will be more specific about the shadow banking system 
in European Union to help to establish the comparison of the shadow banking system in 
China and European Union. 
3.2.1 Development of shadow banking system in European 
Union 
Jeffers (2016) states that there two definitions of shadow banking system (SBS) 
made by the Financial Stability Board. The broad one is that SBS states that the credit 
intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system, and 
the narrow definition states that SBS is a system of credit intermediation that involves 
entities and activities outside the regular banking system, and raises systemic risk 
concerns, in particular by maturity or liquidity transformation, leverage and flawed 
credit risk transfer, and regulatory arbitrage concerns. In addition, the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) highlighted that there are many ways in which 
shadow banks replicate traditional banks, and some shadow banks are part of traditional 
banks. 
The expansion of banks into mortgage area and markets outside Europe has 
brought more risks to the banks. To deal with this situation, banks choose to securitize 
their loans, and this move has transferred the crisis to the shadow banking system. The 
system can be divided into two parts: Monetary Financial Institution (MFI) and non-
monetary financial institution (non-MFIs). Credit institutions and money market funds 
both belong to MFIs, while investment funds, financial vehicle corporations, public 
financial corporations and hedge funds are all non-MFIs. 
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The shadow banking system has been expanding its size and improving its role 
in the euro area in recent years. The financial assets held by financial institutions other 
than banks, including shadow banks, have doubled since 2005. Although the increase 
slowed in 2016, these assets still account for one third of the entire financial system in 
euro area. However, unlike the US market, traditional banks are still the leading 
financial intermediaries in the euro area. The assets of traditional banks completely 
exceed those managed by shadow banks. Investment funds (IFs), financial vehicle 
corporations (FVCs) and money-market funds (MMFs) constitute over half of the 
shadow banking system. The growth of assets in these three fields has been led by the 
expansion of the non-money market investment funds industry.  
Different European countries have quite diverse banking systems due to what 
kind of role the government plays in each country. One common thing among European 
banks is the “coordinated” capitalism produced by public actors’ involvement.  
The similarity between traditional banks and shadow banks is that they both 
intermediate credit. The difference is that the intermediation by traditional banks 
happens under different roofs, while that by shadow banks does not. In the SBS, 
intermediation occurs in several stages of non-banking intermediaries. The vertical 
division of the credit intermediation usually done by traditional banks now occurs in 
one of the stages. In the aspects of information, transaction costs, and risk mitigation, 
the advantage of shadow banks is obvious since financial flow is created throughout 
bank intermediation. These financial flows that happen outside banks, for example, 
flows between households and corporations or government via non-bank credit 
intermediaries, when they involve leverage and maturity transformation, they will be 
labeled as shadow banking intermediation, even when some are not. The two features 
often create risks.  From the global financial crisis, people now know that shadow 
banking system and traditional banking system are closely connected. However, 
because the universal banking system differs in European countries, the particular form 
of interconnectedness also differs. 
Jeffers (2016) states that the “Simple, Transparent and Standardized (STS) 
securitization” currently has been carried out in Europe. Actually euro area banks are 
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dependent on funding from other financial institutions, such as securitization vehicles. 
Traditional banks and shadow banks are closely interconnected even though the systems 
are different in certain degrees among the countries. Issuance largely decreased in 
Europe after the great recession in 2008. Issuance continued, though at lower levels, and 
the ability to of using securitized products increased demand. In the euro area, 
securitization transactions mainly consist of loan securitizations, more specifically, 
household mortgage loans. Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) are the 
products of these transactions. Securitization transactions also consist of commercial 
mortgage loans and consumer credits. Other kinds of transactions like “securitization of 
commercial paper (asset- backed commercial paper or ABCP), bonds, trade receivables 
of non-financial corporations, tax receivables of general government, and re-
securitizations of already securitized assets, and it also play important roles. In Europe, 
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, and Italy are countries that issue the most 
securitized products. Since 2010, there exist signs in Germany, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, and Italy that market-based demand has emerged. By far, in most European 
countries, residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) has been the most 
remarkable asset among all the classes of assets. 
3.2.2 Existing situation of shadow banking system in 
European Union 
At the beginning, there will be some figures to describe the distribution of 
European Union bank’s exposures to shadow banking entities by country of reporting 
institution and domicile of shadow banking entity, which can be used to describe the 
specific existing situation of shadow banking system in European Union. 
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Fig 3.1 Distribution of European Union bank’s exposures to shadow banking 
entities (in billion euros) 
Sources: Abad (2017) 
Fig 3.2 Distribution of European Union bank’s exposures to shadow banking 
entities (as % of GDP of country of reporting bank) 
Sources: Abad (2017) 
From Fig 3.1, Fig 3.2, we can easily get an overview information on mapping 
the interconnectedness between European Union banks and shadow banking entities. 
Also, Abad (2017) states that the exposure of EU banks to shadow banks has great effect 
globally and locally. Approximately 27% of the total exposures domicile in the United 
States. 65% of the exposures are securitizations, non-MMF investment funds and 
finance companies. Shadow banking entities are grouped by the types of countries. EU 
banks do not have much individual focus on shadow banking system. Because different 
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banks are often affected by the same shadow bank, it is quite possible that the EU banks 
will be influence by common sources of vulnerability in times of stress. 
European Commission (2012) states that The European shadow banking system 
is smaller than that in the United States, measuring at about half the size of total banking 
assets, as opposed, it equals to the size of total banking assets in the US. European 
countries with relatively larger shares in the global shadow banking system include 13% 
for UK intermediaries, 8% for Netherland intermediaries, 6% for French intermediaries, 
and 5% for Danish intermediaries. 
Doyle (2016) states that there are several kinds of risks and vulnerabilities in the 
European Union shadow banking system as following: 
 Liquidity risk and risks associated with leverage among some types of 
investment funds (e.g. those which invest in less liquid markets while offering 
daily redeemable shares or which are highly leveraged); 
 interconnectedness and contagion risk across sectors and within the shadow 
banking system, including domestic and cross-border linkages; 
 periodicity, leverage, and liquidity risk created through the use of derivatives 
and securities financing transactions; 
 vulnerabilities in some parts of the other financial institutions sector, where 
significant data gaps prevent a definitive risk assessment. 
3.2.3 Risk of shadow banking system in European Union 
Systemic risk has been defined by Hsu (2013) as the risk that an event will trigger 
a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, 
a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably 
have significant adverse effects on the real economy. Commonly, there are two types of 
systemic risk which can be used to arise in European Union:  
 Liquidity risk, Barnhill (2011) state that it can be used in some situations that 
many financial institutions run into a stone wall in rolling over their short-term 
debt or they could not use a normal bid spread or ask spread to trade assets; 
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 Solvency risk, which means that the financial institutions would face some 
unexpected losses no matter the source, type or size of the losses. 
Hartmann (2000) states that the systemic risk usually happens because of the 
structure of bank balance sheets, the interconnectedness of financial institutions or the 
intertemporal nature of financial products. Thanks to current situation in European 
Union, which has been faced on both liquidity risk and solvency risk due to the causes 
which have been listed above: nature of balance sheets in European Union, the 
interconnectedness of financial institutions, and the maturity mismatches in financial 
contracts. 
Therefore, we have easily seen that the systemic financial crisis in European 
Union is a real menace, especially it has been more important since there is European 
Union-wide expansion of European Union banks has been greatly encouraged. Herd 
effect, which accompanied with the highly dependent in the respect of banking sector 
which has participated in shadow banking activities and the decentralization of banking 
branches within the European Union, brings out the real menace to the financial stability. 
This is controversial in the context of complex financial regulation within the European 
Union. 
European Union has already been systemically affected, there were one time of 
financial crisis around 2013 first entered European Union’s financial system through the 
banks, which are highly connected with the European Union’s industrial sector and they 
could influence the real economy which had been immediately threatened. Banks' 
exposure to subprime mortgages and aggressive expansion into overseas markets 
increased the risk of risky loans to Banks. Banks' exposure to subprime mortgages and 
aggressive expansion into overseas markets increased the risk of risky loans to Banks. 
Securitization of these risky loans have exacerbated the problem and have transferred 
the crisis on to Europe's shadow banking system.  
The financial system itself could be used to divide into monetary, which is the 
money-issue institutions (MFIs) and other monetary financial institutions (non-MFIs). 
MFIs usually make up by credit institutions, money market funds and other MFIs, as 
the same time, the non-MFIs are usually constituted by the investment funds, financial 
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vehicle corporations, insurance and pension funds, public financial corporations, hedge 
funds, and other non-MFIs, which include the financial leasing companies, securities 
lending corporations, and financial auxiliaries. 
Credit agencies account for most of the financial sector, including Banks and 
other types of credit issuers. Banks are not part of the shadow banking system, but they 
have plenty of assets that are indeed part of the shadow banking sector and created 
uncertainty during the credit crisis. In times of crisis, Banks have lost confidence in their 
cross-border peers. The European Commission Green Paper (2012) found that in the 
case of difficult or severe uncertainty, the risks assumed by shadow Banks can be easily 
transferred to the banking industry through the following channels: 
 Borrowing directly from the banking system and bank contingent liabilities 
(credit enhancement and liquidity lines); 
 the bulk of the sale of assets affected financial and real estate prices. 
As the crisis unfolded, both factors spread to the banking sector. 
Hsu (2013) states that financial vehicle companies with close ties to European 
Banks have also been adversely affected. Financial vehicle companies are a kind of 
safety generator which was found throughout European Union, especially in Spain, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy, but it lacks coordinated oversight. European financial 
vehicle companies' common shadow banking assets include asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) and asset-backed securities (ABS), which themselves were used to form 
mortgage debt before the great recession. As the securities market has experienced huge 
losses, financial vehicle companies have suffered in turn. 
Pozsar (2010) hedge funds have been affected also. They actually play a less 
important role in shadow banking sector in the European Union, but the hedge funds are 
deemed as part of asset management sector, they have contributed to credit 
transformation by selling credit default swap (CDS) betting with asset-backed securities 
(ABS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The two main channels that hedge 
funds can and have affected financial stability are through markets and credit channels. 
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When markets disrupt liquidity and pricing through market channels, credit channels 
suffer losses from counterparties, such as Banks and brokers that failed to hedge funds. 
Simon (2012) states that although the investment fund, insurance and pension 
funds and public financial firms are not part of the shadow banking itself, but in these 
institutions and numerous interconnected, exists between the shadow banking assets of 
these institutions by the shadow banking sector and vice versa. This is because the 
European Union shadow banking system is tightly integrated with the financial system, 
and it is possible to have contagion effects by means of financial transmission such as 
interest rates and other aspects of the industry. Shadow banking sends financial pressure 
to the regulated banking sector. Credit agencies such as banks have done a lot of 
business with financial vehicle companies and other counterparties. 
Further, systemic risk is created through long, complex, opaque mediations 
within and between the shadow banking system and traditional banking systems. The 
use of collateral swaps to provide securities with lower collateral for high-quality 
securities, such as lending government bonds against asset-backed securities (ABS), 
which is a good example. Use borrowed securities, banks can obtain the repo financing, 
which can hold the repo financing to meet the liquidity requirements of regulators to 
perform, or in additional transactions using again, to make the longer chains. Another 
example is the source of borrowing by hedge funds.  
3.2.4 Components of shadow banking in EU 
The activities associated with shadow banking include credit transformation and 
liquidity and maturity transformation. In order to better understand the importance of 
shadow banking in EU and asses the statistical data available, it is necessary to translate 
the activities into the identification of specific entities or market segments. The main 
components of shadow banking consist of entities involved in securitization (e.g., 
special vehicles and financial intermediaries), the repo markets, money market funds 
(MMFs), and hedge funds. 
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Securitization activities 
There are many segments of shadow banking, from the loan origination to the 
wholesale funding, are involved in securitization activities, which allows the breakdown 
of the credit intermediation and the increase of both the maturity transformation and the 
liquidity transformation. Tab. 3.3 below summarizes the main features of securitization. 
Tab. 3.3 Main features of securitization 
Activity Funding Entity 
Asset Backed Security 
origination/Asset Backed Security 
warehousing 
Asset Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) Conduits 
Asset Backed Securities 
(ABS) 
Special Purpose Vehicles 
(SPV) 
Repo Broker - dealers 
Asset Backed Security 
issuance/Collateralized Debt Obligation 
(CDO) issuance 
Commercial paper (CP) Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) 
Collateralized Debt 
Obligation (CDO) Broker - dealers 
Asset Backed Security Intermediation 
Asset Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) 
Structured Investment 
Vehicles 
Medium Term Note 
(MTN) Conduits 
Capital notes Hedge funds 
Repo  
Wholesale Funding 
Repo Securities lenders 
Asset Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) Cash funds 
 Money Market Funds (MMF) 
Source: Pozsar et al., (2010),  
Unlike the situation in the United States and the United Kingdom, the lending 
activity is seldom move outside the well-regulated financial system and the original 
lender is allowed to sell the claims to another entity no matter whether it is regulated or 
not in EU. Besides, both asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) and asset backed 
securities (ABSs) are the most important forms of securitization in EU and over half of 
securitized products are residential mortgage backed securities (RMBSs). 
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Money market funds 
Money market funds (MMFs) are created to act as an alternative to bank deposits 
on bank interest rate to the regulatory caps. They are an important source of funding for 
shadow banking by buying certificates of deposits (CDs) and commercial paper (CP) 
and by repo transactions when investing in short-term debt. The institutional investors 
are the main investor group and the regulations governing the investment strategy of 
MMFs vary from country to country. There is a powerful link between the shadow 
banking sector and the regulated banking sector because the European MMFs are closely 
related to the regulated banks. 
The repo markets 
Repos are associated with an agreement between a cash borrower (or repo seller) 
and a cash lender (or repo buyer) on the temporary sale of assets for a specified amount 
of cash and period of time with repo rate paid over the duration of the cash holding by 
the cash borrower to the cash lender. Usually, the repos imply the better protection for 
the cash lender in the case that the cash borrower defaults, which makes them important 
fund-raising financial instruments similar as the unsecured loans and the issuance of 
short-term securities. 
Distinguished by the different underlying assets, there are two types of repos, 
namely the general collateral repos and the special repos. In general collateral repos, the 
collateral is a security chosen among a big amount of securities and the motivation is 
the funding or the liquidity needs of the cash lender; while the special repos focus on a 
specific asset demanded as collateral without the purposes of funding or liquidity needs. 
During the period of financial crisis, the share of the general collateral repos increased 
more compared with the share of the special repos, which means there are some 
replacements of the funding activities in the unsecured money markets. 
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Hedge funds 
Hedge funds are alternative investments by using a pool of funds to earn positive 
returns for the investors through a larger number of different strategies. Simon (2012) 
states that the according to the data which are available at the European Union Central 
Bank, the hedge funds in euro area generally are appearing to acquire a limited role. 
However, whether the hedge funds are component of shadow banking system in 
European Union is still debatable, nevertheless the hedge funds are part of the complex 
network of financial intermediary, the financial intermediary played an important role 
on the development of the shadow banking, whether through securitization activities or 
repo market. So-called credit hedge funds are at least partially involved since their 
strategies are included, for instance, investing in decentralized over-the-counter 
securities, and looking for potential arbitrage opportunities for CDOs mispricing. 
Fig 3.3 Engagement of types of entities in shadow banking activities in EU 
Source: European systemic risk board 2017 
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From Fig 3.3, which shows that the color of the circle reflects the strength of the 
participating institutions in the related field of activity according to the code specified 
in the comments above. 
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4 Potential risk and regulation of the European and Chinese 
shadow banking system 
As we all know that the shadow banking system is not yet mature, of course there 
are a lot of potential risks in both China and Europe. Meanwhile, both Chinese 
government and European Union government are trying to do their best to regulate the 
shadow banking system to reduce the potential risks which would affect their financial 
system. The goal of analysis in this chapter would be what extent of potential risks and 
regulations in Chinese and European Union shadow banking system, which would be 
mainly focused on the variety and size of shadow banking business. 
4.1 Potential risk and regulation of the European shadow 
banking system 
ESRB (2016) states that in recent years, the shadow banking has expanded 
greatly in Europe, the broad shadow banking system accounted approximately 38% of 
the total assets of the European Union financial sector and 272% of European Union 
gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of fourth quarter of 2016, which can be 
summarized as Fig 4.1 in the following: 
Fig 4.1 European Union financial sector (trillion euro) 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from European central bank (2017). 
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The rapid growth of the non-bank financial sector highlights the need for a 
monitoring framework to capture the risks posed by shadow banking entities and 
activities. Although it provides a diversified source of funding for the real economy, 
non-bank financial institutions may pose similar risks to Banks. For example, non-bank 
financial institutions may use leverage that may cause risk amplification throughout the 
financial system while conducting credit intermediation. Even if usage of leverage is 
limited, the liquidity and maturity shifts of the non-bank financial sector can be risky. 
Therefore, non-bank financial institutions to the rise of financial intermediation requires 
close monitoring, so that the authorities can find and evaluate the sources of systemic 
risk, and take the appropriate policies and measures to mitigate these risks. 
Fig 4.2 EU investment funds: liquidity transformation5 
 
Source: European central bank (ECB) 2017. 
For investment funds, which is one type of shadow banking business, the 
liquidity and maturity transformation of investment funds, if poorly managed, can create 
                                                 
5 Liquidity transformation expressed as total assets minus liquid assets. 
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first-mover advantage, leading to liquidity consumption and sales pressure during the 
period of pressure. As a result, the European Union fast-growing investment fund needs 
to closely monitor its activities and assess its role in promoting the impact of financial 
markets. A criterion measure of open bond fund liquidity illiquid assets accounted for 
the proportion of total assets, according to the Fig 4.2, in the past seven years in the 
illiquid assets accounted for from 30% to nearly 30%. 
The risk of financial stability may be increased by direct or indirect exposures 
and ownership connections between credit institutions and shadow banking entities. 
Shadow banking entities can form part of a complex financial intermediation chain that 
can cross national boundaries and across different sectors of the financial system. As 
the global financial crisis has shown, the lack of information and transparency about 
these linkages could pose a challenge to systemic risk monitoring when entities are 
located in different jurisdictions. 
Fig 4.3 Euro area credit institutions’ assets 
 
Source: ECB 2017. 
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There is a significant interconnection between credit institutions and entities 
with broad shadow banking operations. According to Fig 4.3, there are more than 8% 
of euro area credit institutions’ assets are linked to euro area investment funds and other 
financial institutions through loans, debt securities and equity or investment fund shares. 
In addition, 7% of euro area credit institutions' liabilities are deposits from euro area 
investment funds and other financial institutions, which can be shown as Fig 4.4 in the 
following: 
Fig 4.4 Euro area credit institutions’ deposits sources 
 
Source: ECB 2017. 
4.1.1 Financial vehicle corporations 
Financial vehicle corporations engaged in the securitization business are subsets 
of specialized vehicles committed to the transfer of credit risk, converting non-current 
assets into more liquid debt securities. In some cases, the transfer of credit risk is 
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achieved through derivatives. Concern about the risk of shadow banking in financial 
vehicle corporations (FVCs) are related to credit intermediation, especially with banking 
sector. Banks and non-bank financial institutions may rely on securitization for 
financing and promote off-balance-sheet credit risk transfer. European systemic risk 
board (2017) indicates that while securitization can reduce the cost of financing and 
facilitate loans to the real economy, it could also lead to systemic over-leveraging and 
reduce lending standards. The ownership of equity in FVC is usually negligible, 
resulting in high leverage at the entity level. 
Fig 4.5 Euro area FVCs’ assets (trillion euro) 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from ECB 2017. 
From Fig 4.5, we can easily conclude that at the end of the fourth quarter of 2016, 
euro area FVCs’ total assets reached 1.8 trillion euros. In the long term, the total assets 
of FVCs in the euro area fell by 24% between 2010 and the fourth quarter of 2016, 
including a decline in the credit cycle after the financial crisis. With regard to asset 
portfolio, by the end of 2016, securitization loans amounted to 1.2 trillion euros, 
accounting for 66 percent of total assets. 
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Fig 4.6 Loans securitized by euro area FVCs  
 
Source: ECB 2017. 
From Fig 4.6, we can analyze that from the point of absolute value, between 
2010 to 2015 the average transactions compared with the average level in 2016, in the 
same time, the securitized loans related to euro area non-MFIs decreased from 69% to 
46%, meanwhile, the securitized loans related to euro area non-MFIs increased from 11% 
to 21%. European systemic risk board (2017) indicates that in terms of debt, outstanding 
debt issued by the euro zone's FVC fell from 2.0 trillion euros in the first quarter of 2010 
to 1.4 trillion euros in the fourth quarter of 2016. 
European system of financial supervision (2017) indicates that maturity 
transformation is not a significant feature of FVCs, although it represents the main risk. 
For instance, even a few FVCS have a maturity mismatch, causing securitized bond 
investors to receive no payment at maturity, but the functioning of a very liquid 
securitized bond market may be disrupted. As proved during the crisis, this maturity 
transformation of FVCs credit intermediation can be a risk to financial stability. In 
general, the maturity transformation of the euro area's FVCs does not imply broad 
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industry risk and has remained relatively stable over the past few years. The risk of MFI 
holding up to FVC's maturity transformation was 74% in the fourth quarter of 2016 and 
has remained largely unchanged in recent years, which can be expressed as Fig 4.7 in 
the following: 
Fig 4.7 Euro area FVCs’ maturity transformation 
 
Source: ECB 2017. 
Also, from Fig 4.7, we can find out that in relation to the euro area banking 
system, 59% of the euro area's FVC assets are linked to the euro area's MFIs. In terms 
of liabilities, 42% of the euro zone's FVC is linked to the MFIs in the euro area, mainly 
because the number of securitizes that are kept allows banks to access the central bank's 
liquidity facilities. Moreover, securitization has experienced a degree of change in 
mortgage security. For example, the average ratio of RMBS securitization was 56% 
from 2010 to 2015, and the average level was 50% in 2016, while ABS securitization 
increased from 21% to 30%, which can be expressed as Fig 4.8 in the following: 
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Fig 4.8 European securitization issuance by collateral 
 
Source: Association for financial markets in Europe 2017. 
4.1.2 Derivatives 
Derivatives trading involves various non-bank financial institutions. The risk 
associated with the shadow banking in the market, use derivatives to establish synthetic 
lever increased exposure to the entity, and may pose a threat to financial stability 
through a variety of channels. As a risk transfer tool, for example, derivatives 
significantly increase the interconnectedness between shadow banking entities and the 
banking sector and the shadow banking system. In addition to the risks and 
vulnerabilities associated with interconnectivity, counterparty risk, credit risk and pro-
cyclical behavior can be used as further risk transmission channels in the derivatives 
market. 
The correlation and contact of "other finance" in the derivatives market need to 
be closely monitored. In addition, non-bank financial institutions have a significant 
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portion of these markets unfinished business. In general, interest rate swaps (IRS) are 
widely used as hedging instruments between Banks and other intermediaries, but may 
make individuals sensitive to interest rate changes. The credit derivatives market, in 
particular the credit default swap market (CDS), transfers counterparties and basic credit 
risks. Foreign exchange (FX) derivatives markets, on the other hand, allow financial and 
non-financial counterparty unnecessary exchange risk hedge, and between the financial 
system and real economy more closely linked than other forms of derivatives. Due to 
the topological features of the interest rate swap (IRS) and credit default swaps (CDS) 
networks, most counterparties trade with 16 of the largest dealer communities, known 
as G16. Fig 4.9 shows that these other financial institutions are involved in the 
derivatives trades of heterogeneous trading partners in the IRS and foreign exchange 
markets, and they mainly trade with G16 dealers in the CDS market: 
Fig 4.9 EU derivatives markets in 2017(billion euro) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from European systemic risk board 
2017. 
In addition to establishing links between banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, derivatives can also be used to influence exposure. However, further 
evaluation of shadow banking entities involved in derivative transactions is hampered 
by the lack of detailed information on the types of non-bank financial institutions. 
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Similar to other forms of leverage, this could increase the pro-cyclicality of the financial 
system. Although synthetic leverage can play an important role in the derivatives market, 
further analysis is needed to assess and measure the risks arising from such leverage. 
4.1.3 Securities financing transactions 
Securities financing transactions (SFTs), including repos, securities lending and 
margin loans, helped create the risk of a shadow banking system. SFT promote credit 
growth and maturity outside the banking system and liquidity transformation, and not 
only to the leverage, the demand and supply for certain securities also has pro-cyclical 
effect, for example, those who are seeking as collateral. If you invest in longer-dated 
securities, reinvestment in cash collateral may involve liquidity and term conversion. In 
addition, non-cash collateral is often reused, creating an opaque chain of collateral 
within and within the department. 
Fig 4.10 Size of the EU repo market in 2017 
 
Source: ICMA and European securities and market authority (ESMA) 2017. 
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The repo market has reduced the financial sector, which is part of the mortgage 
transition chain that is not sold in cash for future repurchases. From Fig 4.10, we can 
see that the international capital market association (ICMA), an industry association, 
estimates that the EU repo market's nominal total outstanding contracts at the end of 
2016 about 5.7 trillion euros, roughly unchanged from the previous year and well below 
the 2010 peak. 
Repos are usually short-term instruments, and lenders and borrowers can easily 
decide to leave the market in a short time. According to ICMA, in June 2016, 51% of 
repurchase contracts mature in less than a week, and 30% of the maturity is one week 
to three months. Several countries' sovereign repurchase rates fell in 2016, reflecting 
comparable growth in the cost of securities lending. The usual year-end volatility could 
be reinforced by new expectations of monetary policy and fears of a shortage of high-
quality collateral in the euro area, which can be expressed as Fig 4.11 in the following: 
Fig 4.11 Repo rate on selected sovereigns 
 
Source: Repo funds rates and ESMA 2017. 
The repo responsibility of MFIs contributes to the interlinkages within the 
financial system. By the end of 2016, non-microfinance institutions had about 270 
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billion euros in repo debt, in the medium term, the amount outstanding has fallen from 
about 400 billion euros in 2012, according to the Fig 4.12 in the following: 
Fig 4.12 Euro area MFIs’ repo liabilities with non-MFIs 
.  
Source: European Central Bank 2017. 
Open maturity transactions in SFT markets usually are more risk than term 
maturity transactions. In times of economic stress, lenders may withdraw securities that 
are lent on the maturity date, and borrowers may not be able to return them in a short 
period of time. The liquidity conversion occurs when cash collateral is received during 
the open period and reinvested when the maturity is due. Finally, securities lending 
activities help to increase the interconnectedness of the financial system. Especially at 
the end of the fourth quarter of 2016, involves the equity, government bonds and 
corporate bonds beneficially owned human investment fund securities lending 
transactions, respectively for 24 billion euros, 11 billion euros and 6.3 billion euros. The 
number of government bonds has fallen by nearly 6 billion euros compared with a year 
ago, which can be expressed as Fig 4.13 in the following: 
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Fig 4.13 Outstanding value of EU securities on loan owned by investment funds 
 
Source: Markit Ltd. and ESMA 2017. 
European Systemic Risk Board indicates that from 2018, the new regulatory data 
collected under securities financing transaction regulation (SFTR) will provide a more 
granular mapping of the securities financing transaction (SFT) market.6 According to 
the regulation, all market participants must report the SFT detailed information, 
including the composition of the collateral, whether collateral can reuse and has been 
repeated use, at the end of the day instead of collateral and applicable deductions. 
                                                 
6 Regulation (EU) No 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2015 on transparency of securities financing transactions and of reuse and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
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4.2 Potential risk and regulation in Chinese shadow 
banking system 
The broadly defined shadow banking business has stalled in China in the first 
half of 2017 amid continued regulatory clampdown. In the first six months of 2017, total 
shadow banking assets barely grew, falling as a percentage of GDP for the first time 
since 2012. 
The slowdown in economic growth was due to a fall in the number of high-risk 
tools, for instance, the wealth management products (WMPs) issued by banks and asset 
management plans channeled through non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) 
regulated by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Interbank investors 
hold share of the wealth management products have begun to shrink, bank claims of 
non-bank financial institutions are declining, which suggests that recent measures are to 
reduce the financial system of interconnected, and solve the increasingly complex and 
opaque financing chain caused by the financial system vulnerability. This suggests that 
regulatory measures may have some effect in stimulating the deleveraging of the 
financial sector. 
However, credit demand for the real economy remains strong, as is the continued 
expansion of core shadow Banks, in addition to bank loans and corporate bond issuance. 
Included in the total social financing (TSF) in the "core" shadow banking business 
continued to show signs of strong growth, trust and entrusted loans are growth, not 
discount the bankers’ acceptances of expansion for the first time in three years. 
The people's Bank of China is boosting the decreasing of risk in the financial 
sector by expanding its liquidity supply. Although yields have risen, but in September 
the new issue of the interbank negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD) hit a record high, 
indicating that some small and medium-sized Banks facing the double pressure. Because 
of the people's Bank of China "modest and neutral" monetary policy stance and the 
Banks' ability to obtain financing has been decreased through the shadow banking 
channels, market liquidity tightening, the people's Bank of China through long-term 
repo increased liquidity supply, in order to make Banks more time to give up their 
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portfolios. Small and medium-sized Banks, in particular, have reduced their reliance on 
wholesale funding and are increasingly reliant on central-bank funding. 
The challenges associated with tighter regulation and widespread deleveraging 
remain. After the 19th national congress of the Chinese communist party, financial 
sector regulation may continue to suppress the growth of shadow banking, and solve 
some of the key imbalances in the financial system. But the authorities still face the 
challenge of reducing the risk of systemic damage from the financial sector. In addition 
to these challenges, some shadow banking products are opaque, and regulatory measures 
often end up encouraging financial innovation to circumvent tighter regulation. In 
addition, the ability of the formal system to replace shadow credit is limited, and bank 
credit may not be the perfect substitute for shadow credit. 
4.2.1 Credit conditions 
The broad shadow banking assets defined in Fig 4.14 barely increased in the first 
six months to 64.7 trillion yuan, compared with 64.4 trillion yuan at the end of 2016. 
Fig 4.14 Size of banks and shadow banking business in China (trillion RMB) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Moody’s 2017. 
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From Fig 4.14, we can conclude that for the first time since 2012, nominal gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate more than shadow banking assets, resulting in a 
decline in the shadow banking business in June 2017 to 82.6% of GDP, and the peak 
value of the end of 2016 to 86.5% in 2016. The slowdown was largely due to a fall in 
the balance of bank WMPs and NBFIs' asset management plans, some of which were 
not available in TSF but have been the focus of recent regulatory measures. 
Fig 4.15 Size of core shadow banking 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
From Fig 4.15, we can conclude that the strength of the "core" shadow banking 
sector has partially offset the decline in wealth management products. Tighter regulatory 
scrutiny of the shadow banking component was not available in TSF, leading to a drop 
in its high growth rate. However, the expansion of the "core" shadow banking business, 
including entrusted loans, trust loans and undiscounted bank acceptance bills, has 
continued to accelerate. As a result, the share of core shadow Banks in the broad shadow 
banking sector has increased slightly. Although overall credit growth fell in the third 
quarter of 2017, while nominal GDP growth remained stable, overall leverage continued 
to rise. 
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Fig 4.16 Comparison of core shadow banking and total social financing 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
From Fig 4.16, we can get some information that formal bank lending is still the 
main driver of the new TSF flows and corporate bond financing has risen. In the new 
TSF flow, the official bank loan has dropped in the third quarter of 2017, but is still 
above 2008, for most of the last decade. Corporate bond financing has rallied strongly 
after the low issuance in the past two months, prompting TSF to raise its total share of 
direct financing to its highest level in 2017. 
Fig 4.17 Type of core shadow banking business 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
From Fig 4.17 above, we know that core shadow banking activities accelerated 
further. By the end of the third quarter of 2017, the growth in core shadow banking 
business grew to 18.2% from a year earlier, and has continued to rebound since the 
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fourth quarter of 2016. For the first time, the contribution of undiscounted bank 
acceptance has returned to positive territory for the past three years. Some of the 
relatively good regulation of credit supply to the shadow banking sector, such as credit 
companies, has increased transparency and could increase the system's ability to cope 
with unexpected shocks. Regulators, however, stress that trust is increasingly risky for 
borrowers' property and industries with excess capacity. 
Since the second half of 2016, regulators have paid more and more attention to 
WMP, and WMP has been a significant growth point for the rapid growth of the banking 
industry. The strengthening of regulation involves the inclusion of Banks' off-balance-
sheet WMP operations in the macro-prudential assessment (MPA) framework of the 
People's Bank of China, and imposes tighter restrictions on transactions between Banks 
and non-bank financial institutions. As of June 2017, these measures have led to a 
decline in WMP - funded assets from 43% of total shadow banking assets to 47% by the 
end of 2016. By contrast, core shadow Banks, including entrusted loans, trust loans and 
undiscounted bank acceptance bills have increased slightly over the same period, which 
can be expressed as Fig 4.18 in the following: 
Fig 4.18 Regulatory crackdown produces results (as % of total shadow banking 
assets) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Moody’s 2017. 
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Tougher rules will also slow asset management. MFIs, which is regulated by the 
CSRC, which have passed strict asset management rules that led to three consecutive 
quarters of declines in assets under management by fund companies and their 
subsidiaries. Assets managed by securities firms also shrank in the second quarter of 
2017. The broad asset management industry will remain the focus of the newly 
established committee on financial stability and development. In addition, the People's 
Bank of China proposed a comprehensive regulatory framework for asset management 
in February 20177. If implemented, Banks would have a positive impact on credit, as it 
would improve regulators' ability to manage growth in shadow banking and reduce the 
scope of regulatory arbitrage, which can be expressed as Fig 4.19 in the following: 
Fig 4.19 Asset management business (trillion RMB) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Asset management association 
of China. 
The share of big Banks in the financial system has stabilized. In the first half of 
2017, the share of the big state-owned Banks in the financial system's assets, after a 
sharp decline in the previous year, remained stable from 2016, according to Fig 4.20 in 
the following: 
                                                 
7 News from finance.sina.cn. 
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Fig 4.20 Financial sector asset composition 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Moody’s 2017. 
The main influencing factors are: adjustment of asset growth and the reduction 
of the balance of financial products issued by joint-stock Banks, followed by the gradual 
reduction of assets under management by securities companies and fund subsidiaries. 
Because of the multilayer credit transactions between Banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, these factors of the financial system have the stable financing structure and 
transparency is low, so slightly reduce risks around the financial system. Nevertheless, 
the share of the overall asset management business of non-bank financial institutions 
has more than doubled since the beginning of the decade. 
4.2.2 Wealth management products 
Enhanced regulatory measures have dampened the growth of WMPS off-balance 
sheet. As of June 2017, the balance of wealth management products issued or allocated 
by Banks has fallen from 29.1 trillion yuan at the end of 2016 to rmb28.4 trillion, 
equivalent to 19.5% of bank deposits, which would be shown as Fig 4.21 in the 
following: 
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Fig 4.21 Growth of off-balance sheet WMPs 
Source: China Banking Association 2017. 
As presented above Fig 4.21, which shows that the implied year-on-year growth 
rate was 8.0%, compared with 23.6% in 2016 and 56.5% in 2015. According to the 
CBRC, the growth rate of uncompleted WMPs fell to 4.0% as of the end of September. 
The decrease in WMP's outstanding balance is a positive credit. It inhibits the incentive 
for banks to participate in regulatory arbitrage and reduces the vulnerability of the 
financial system. 
The impact of tighter regulation on joint-stock banks is greatest. Although all 
commercial Banks report in the first half of 2017 outstanding balance of wealth 
management products, but the influence of the small and medium-sized banks, the 
biggest because they show that largest rise in off-balance-sheet financial product growth 
rate in the past. Joint-stock banks also led to a decline in the proportion of outstanding 
wealth management products relative to their assets, followed by urban commercial 
banks as presented below: 
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Fig 4.22 Changing WMPs of banks in China (outstanding WMPs as % of total 
assets) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Wind Information Ltd. 
Bonds, mainly corporate bonds, remain the largest asset class for Banks to issue 
WMPs, although their share fell in the first six months of 2017. In general, the bond 
assets, including deposits, money market instruments and liquidity non-standard debt 
assets (NSDA) is less, while the share of similar products show up to 14.7% from 9.0% 
over the same period as shown below: 
Fig 4.23 WMPs asset breakdown 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from China Banking Association 
2017. 
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A lack of public disclosure of exposure to the WMP investment industry has 
limited transparency about the investment or ultimate borrower. Multiple levels of credit 
trading also hinder transparency, and many WMP investments may have a higher single 
industry or borrower risk. 
Fig 4.24 Balance of off-balance sheet WMPs 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
From Fig 4.24, we could find out that off-balance-sheet WMPS pushed the 
balance down. The decrease in the performance of financial products is mainly driven 
by external appearance. These are not the main protected products, but often 
accompanied by implicit bank guarantees. By the end of June 2017, they accounted for 
76% of the total outstanding WMPs, down from 80% at the end of 2016. By contrast, 
the share of the balance sheet WMPs has grown to an all-time high. The inclusion of the 
WMP business outside the bank table in the macro-prudential assessment MPA 
framework may explain this trend. It enhances the ability of regulators to monitor the 
rate of expansion of off-balance-sheet credit. 
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Fig 4.25 Maturity mismatch between WMPs and underlying assets eases 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
As presented above the Fig 4.25, we can conclude that the short term (1-3 months) 
WMP still dominates the newly released products, accounting for nearly 47% of the 
total, but its share has declined for four consecutive quarters. The proportion of newly 
issued WMPs from three to twelve months rose from 45% in the previous quarter to 46% 
in the third quarter of 2017. 
4.2.3 E-finance 
The share of e-financial users continues to grow recent years in China. The 
increase in internet use is a key driver of the development of China's financial 
technology industry. According to the China Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC), the total number of Internet users in the first half of 2017 was 751 million, 
accounting for 54.3% of the total population. 
Fig 4.26 Share of e-finance users 
Source: China Internet Network Information Center 2017. 
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As the Internet becomes easier to use, electronic payments, electronic banking 
and online wealth management services are also growing. Nearly two-thirds of Internet 
users use electronic payments (68%) and half use electronic banking (50.9%). Online 
wealth management services, though relatively small, are rising. 
As time gone, Chinese government stepped up oversight of non-bank electronic 
payment transactions. Although the electronic payment transactions overall share of 
dealing with non-bank electronic payment by bank electronic platform processing 
compared to trading volume is still small, but growing steadily since 2014, to 4.5% of 
the total amount of electronic payment transactions in the first half of 2017 as Fig 4.27 
below: 
Fig 4.27 E-payment transactions 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
In August 2017, the People's Bank of China accelerated the regulation of the 
rapidly growing third-party payment industry8, requiring that all online payments be 
cleared through a unified platform. Online payment supervision will be further 
concentrated. 
                                                 
8 News from money.163.com. 
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Fig 4.28 P2P lending. 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
Recent years in China, the peer-to-peer lending grew moderately, by the end of 
2017 at the end of the third quarter, China through peer-to-peer (P2P) lending expanded 
micro credit balance of RMB 1.15 trillion. However, in the third quarter of 2017, the 
number of operating platforms continued to fall by 5.2% in the first half of 2017 and 
fell 13.5% in the first half of 2017. Since risk management is weak leading to high 
default rates, P2P lending has attracted regulatory concerns, although so far, it has not 
yet constituted a systemic risk in view of the small size of the industry (approximately 
1.6% of the total number of shadow banking assets as of 2016). 
As example, by 2017 at the end of the third quarter, assets under management 
(AUM) jump in dollar terms to $238 billion, Yu’e Bao is still the world's largest money 
market funds as Fig 4.29 below: 
Fig 4.29 Comparison of several biggest money market funds 
Source: Moody’s 2017. 
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The AUM growth of Yu'e Bao fell significantly to 9 per cent in the third quarter 
of 2017, compared with 41% in the first two quarters and 26 per cent in the first two 
quarters, although it reached a new high of 1.56 trillion yuan. The slowdown in asset 
growth appears to be due to a combination of tighter regulation and lower yields. As of 
the third quarter of 2017, the fund's seven-year annualized yield fell below 4.0%. This 
may reflect the rules of the securities and futures commission released in August 2017, 
aimed at improving liquidity risk management of money market funds (MMF) industry, 
focus on big investors focus on potential risks of MMF as Fig 4.30 below: 
Fig 4.30 Yu’e Bao assets 
Source: official report from Yu’e Bao 2017. 
After the decision in May 2017 to reduce the upper limit of the individual 
account balance to RMB 250,000 yuan from the previous rmb100 million, the fund 
announced that it will further reduce the cap to RMB 100,000 in August 2017, which 
will further improve its liquidity risk management.9 
4.2.4 Trust sector 
Nowadays in China, the trust lending growth remains strong. In the first two 
quarters of 2017, credit lending surged as credit lending soared in the second half of 
2016. The strong growth reflects the CBRC's July 2016 decision10 to tighten the bank's 
                                                 
9 News from Yu’e Bao official announcement. 
10 News from CBRC 2016. 
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WMP business rules. The proposal specifies that the trust sector is the only allowed 
intermediary channel for banks to invest in non-standard debt assets. As a result, the 
trust industry is now playing an increasingly important role as a conduit for bank 
transfers and expansion of shadow credit, while the ability of non-bank financial 
institutions as regulated by the China securities regulatory commission has been reduced 
as a conduit for bank transfers, which shown as Fig 4.31 below: 
Fig 4.31 Growth of trust loans 
Source: China Trustee Association 2017. 
However, regulators have recently stressed that trust companies are increasingly 
exposed to real estate and overcapacity. Tighter rules on trust loans could increase 
refinancing risks for corporate borrowers that rely heavily on shadow credit, which can 
be presented below: 
Fig 4.32 Trust sector assets 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from China Trustee Association 
2017. 
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4.2.5 Interconnectedness and Spillover Risks to Banks 
The relationship between Banks and non-bank financial institutions has declined 
slightly recent years in China. In the past three years, signs of a rapid rise in the 
interconnections between Banks, mainly small and medium-sized Banks, and shadow 
Banks have begun to emerge. Banks' net claims to non-bank financial institutions fell in 
the third quarter of 2017. Tighter regulatory restrictions on transactions between Banks 
and non-bank financial institutions have slightly reduced the scope of regulatory 
arbitrage as Fig 4.33 below: 
Fig 4.33 Net claims on NBFIs 
Source: People’s Bank of China 2017. 
According to data from Fig 4.34, by June 2017, investment in accounts 
receivable from absolute value further dropped to 11.4 trillion yuan, from 2016 at the 
end of 11.8 trillion RMB to 11.4 trillion RMB. Their share of total assets fell to 7.7% 
from 8.4% in the same period. But there are different trends among Banks.  
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Fig 4.34 Investment receivables of major traditional banks in China (investment 
receivables as % of total assets) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Moody’s. 
From Fig 4.34 above, the nine listed joint-stock Banks reported a significant 
decline in investment receivables relative to assets. In contrast, the 12 regional Banks' 
investment receivables grew faster than the total asset growth rate of the first six months 
of 2017. Limited asset composition and asset quality disclosure may mask potential 
credit risks, which are increasingly concentrated among regional Banks. 
Also, the insurance sector become a new source of shadow finance in China. 
Insurers have shifted their asset allocation on so-called "other investments" and stocks 
after easing restrictions on permitted investment assets in 2012. "Other investments" 
mainly include project debt plans and broad shadow banking products such as asset 
management products, trust plans and other alternative investment tools. The continued 
growth of alternative investments is bad for credit because it reduces the transparency 
of insurers' assets and undermines their return on stability and liquidity. These 
investments generate additional credit risk. Small and medium-sized insurers are more 
vulnerable because they are less able to manage alternative investment risks. It presented 
as Fig 4.35 in the following: 
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Fig 4.35 Insurers’ investments (as % of insurers investments) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Moody’s 2017. 
4.3 Summary of  potential risk and regulation of shadow 
banking system in China and European Union 
After the analysis of shadow banking system in both China and European Unions, 
we find out that in recent years there were rapidly expansion of shadow banking system 
in both China and European Union after the financial crisis in 2008. Nowadays, the 
various types of shadow banking business have been more and more important in 
Chinese and European Union’s financial system, due to the short-term of development 
of shadow banking system, most of regulatory and investors are lack of the control of 
the shadow banking business, which results that there still are some unknown risks could 
influence the stability of original financial system. Moreover, most individual investors 
and financial institutions are losing their confidence of the single and traditional 
investments tools, which made them turn to invest in shadow banking business, 
meanwhile, they are facing the challenge of avoiding the risks and so did regulatory. 
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Tab 4.1 Size of shadow banking (trillion euros) 
 Chinese shadow banking business 
European Union shadow 
banking business 
Size of shadow banking 
as % of GDP 2016 86.5% 272% 
2015 64.9% 217.6% 
2014 51.9% 171.36% 
GDP 2016 9.08 13.367 
2015 8.971 13.306 
2014 8.455 15.106 
Size of shadow banking 
2016 7.8542 36.358 
2015 5.819 28.954 
2014 4.388 25.886 
Source: Author calculations based on data from World-bank. 
According to Tab 4.1, we can find out that the shadow banking system undertake 
more responsibilities of financial system in European Union than it in China. As we 
mentioned before, the most risks of shadow banking business are unknown, which 
means that the European Union are facing more potential risks of shadow banking 
system, the rest can be done in the same manner, the regulation of shadow banking 
system would be harder to establish perfect in European Union than it in China. 
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Tab 4.2 Core types of shadow banking business 
China  European Union 
Entrust loans  Investment funds 
Wealth management products  Financial vehicle corporations 
E‐ finance  Derivatives 
  Securities financial transactions 
  Repos 
Source: Author. 
According to Tab 4.2, accompanied with some information introduced before, 
we find out that the most popular types of shadow banking business in both China and 
European Union. 
After the specific analysis of each tool of shadow banking business, we discover 
that the most of shadow banking business in China are highly related with traditional 
banks, which could not be separated with the unique national conditions of China. Due 
to this kind of reasons, in my own opinion, the potential risk normally could be found 
earlier and controlled well in the early stage, after all, the traditional banking system 
have run a lot of years, which means that the regulation has been matured and the 
potential risks could have their way to find. For example, the entrust loans must through 
the traditional banks to issue in China; the wealth management products are only legally 
done in traditional banks; the Yu’e Bao, which has the most market share in China as 
E-finance, it has to have corporation with commercial banks. 
For European Union shadow, the most popular types of shadow banking 
business are related to new financial investment tools based on original financial system. 
In other hand, these kinds of new financial investment tools normally have high risk in 
the process, which would lead to hard control in them. Although the European financial 
regulatory have started their attention on them, they do still have no effective regulations 
about these kind of business. As a result, the shadow banking business are facing more 
unknown risks which could not be controlled in European Union. 
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In China, the regulation on shadow banking system, which has not been 
established perfect yet. The only one official regulation from the Chinese government 
is that the Chinese state council 107th article. It measures that according to the principle 
of who is responsible for the risk disposal of the organization. For example, the wealth 
management business of banking institutions is supervised by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission; the wealth management business of securities and futures 
institutions and various private equity investment funds are supervised by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission; the wealth management business of insurance 
institutions is supervised by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission; the financial 
institutions' cross-market wealth management business and third party business are The 
central bank is responsible for regulatory coordination. 
According to European Commission, there was a regulation on the transparency 
of securities financing transactions in November 2015, These rules increase 
transparency, reporting and disclosure requirements for organizations involved in the 
SFT, making it easier to monitor and assess the risks involved in these transactions. 
Finally, based on previous analysis, Europe has more matured financial system 
than China, they could have more experience to regulate the risk of new financial 
business which are shadow banking business. In other hand, China commands all 
shadow banking business to follow the rules, which means that if they wanted to do the 
business, they must have corporation with traditional banks, this way could make 
Chinese government easier to regulate them, and now, it seems works well. So, it is hard 
to determine which one have low risks or effective regulations, because they all have 
their own merits and demerits. Shadow banking system is still a new financial system 
for both China and European Union, no one has established the perfect regulation system 
on regulating the shadow banking system yet, they all need time to fix the problems of 
risks and regulations about it. 
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5 Conclusion 
Due to the different national conditions, there are a lot of differences between 
China and European Union in the aspect of shadow banking system. However, they have 
a same reason why shadow banking system appear, which is that after the financial crisis 
in 2008, individual investors and financial institutions were not satisfied with the 
traditional banks to finance. 
The goal of this thesis is the description and the analysis potential risk and 
regulation of shadow banking system in China and European Union. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters, the first and fifth chapter are introduction 
and conclusion, the second chapter is the theoretical background of the shadow banking 
system, the third chapter is the description of shadow banking system in European Union 
and China, and the fourth chapter is the analysis of potential risk and regulation of 
European and Chinese shadow banking system. 
For China, which is a socialist country, it means that the central government 
would dominant most of activities, including the financing. However, Chinese 
government also want to make their financial system more diversification, as we know, 
most of biggest banks are owned by Chinese central government, so they absolutely 
want to understand most of financing activities to reduce the risks, in order to prevent 
their citizen from losing. The government command all participants of shadow banking 
business get relationship with traditional banks, which could reduce the ‘shadow’ of 
business, thereby it could reduce the potential risks well and also establish a better 
regulation. Nevertheless, the financial system of China is not matured as it in European 
Union, which means that the Chinese government are lack of experience of making 
regulation in shadow banking system, compared with European Union regulatory. 
Most countries in European Union are capitalist countries, their financial market 
seem like more liberalization than it in China. Absolutely, most of participants of 
shadow banking business, they do not need make relationship with traditional banks, 
they could be more ‘shadow’ to finance, moreover, this phenomenon would lead the 
shadow banking system easier to evade regulation, in the same time, it could bring a lot 
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of unknown potential risks to investors. However, most of countries in European Union 
are developed countries, they have established a matured financial system before the 
appearance of shadow banking system, obviously they would have more experience to 
make a new way to regulate the shadow banking system well. 
Based on previous analysis, due to the different national system, although the 
Chinese government would permit the shadow banking business operate in China, they 
want to help investors to prevent the potential risks from shadow banking business. 
That’s why they make most of shadow banking business involved into their familiar 
area, making relationship to traditional banks they owned, which could make them 
easier to make the regulation. Most countries of European Union, they have matured 
financial system, moreover, they indulge most participants of shadow banking market 
to free operate, which have resulted that the size of shadow banking business have 
accounted for 272% of GDP in 2016, it presents they would have more risks that if most 
of shadow banking business failed, which could influence their financial system. In 
summary, Chinese and European Union have their merits and demerits in prevention of 
potential risk and regulation, it is hard to say which one is better. 
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Annex 1: European Union financial sector (trillion euro) 
 
 
Monetary 
financial 
institutions 
(excluding 
money 
market 
funds) 
Money 
market 
funds 
Non-MMF 
investment 
funds 
Other 
financial 
institutions 
Insurance 
corporations 
and pension 
funds 
2012 53.2 1.1 8.5 22.3 12.8 
2015 49.6 1.3 11.7 26.6 16.1 
2016 50.4 1.2 12.3 26.8 16.5 
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Annex 2: Euro area FVCs’ assets (trillion euro) 
 
 
securities 
loans debt securities 
other 
securitized 
assets 
other assets 
2010 1.51 0.3 0.1 0.5 
2011 1.49 0.28 0.1 0.6 
2012 1.38 0.27 0.1 0.5 
2013 1.3 0.26 0.1 0.4 
2014 1.25 0.25 0.1 0.4 
2015 1.26 0.24 0.1 0.3 
2016 1.24 0.23 0.1 0.3 
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Annex 3: EU derivatives markets in 2017 (billion euro) 
 
 G 16 dealers Banks ICPFs 
Other 
financials 
IRS 1000 120 180 200 
FX 600 420 20 215 
CDS 300 20 0 10 
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Annex 4: Size of banks and shadow banking business in China (trillion RMB) 
 
 Shadow banking Bank loans 
Total bank assets 
(including bank 
loans) 
2011 20 60 110 
2012 25 65 125 
2013 30 70 140 
2014 35 75 155 
2015 40 80 170 
2016 50 85 185 
2017 50 90 200 
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Annex 5: Regulatory crackdown in China (as % of total shadow banking assets) 
 
 Trust loans 
Entrusted 
loans 
Undiscounted 
bankers' 
acceptances 
Assets 
funded by 
WMPs^ 
Others 
2013 15% 22% 21% 20% 22% 
2014 13% 23% 17% 27% 21% 
2015 10% 21% 11% 40% 18% 
2016 10% 21% 6% 47% 17% 
2017 11% 21% 7% 43% 18% 
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Annex 6: Asset management business in China (trillion RMB) 
 
 2014 2015 2016 2017Q1 2017Q2 
Trust 
companies 14 6.5 20 22 23 
Fund 
companies 
and 
subsidiaries 
6 13 17 16.5 15 
Securities 
firms 8 12 18 19 18.5 
Insures 9 11 13 14 14.5 
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Annex 7: Financial sector asset composition in China 
 
 
Five 
biggest 
banks' 
assets 
Small and 
midsize 
banks' 
assets 
Other 
depository 
corporations' 
assets 
Assets 
under 
management 
by NBFIs 
Central 
bank assets 
(excluding 
foreign 
assets) 
2010 42% 21% 23% 9% 4% 
2012 38% 23% 23% 12% 3% 
2014 33% 24% 23% 16% 3% 
2016 28% 25% 22% 20% 3% 
2017Q2 28% 24% 22% 20% 3% 
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Annex 8: Changing WMPs of banks in China (outstanding WMPs as % of total assets) 
 
 
joint-stock 
banks 
city 
commercial 
bank 
state-owned 
bank 
rural financial 
institutions 
2014 17% 27% 28% 26% 
2015 9% 13% 16% 14% 
2016 9% 12% 11% 15% 
2017H1 2% 3% 6% 5% 
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Annex 9: WMPs asset breakdown in China 
 
 bonds 
non-standard 
debt assets 
money 
market 
instruments 
cash and 
deposits 
equity-like 
products and 
others 
2014 29.80% 20.90% 14% 26.60% 8.70% 
2015 29.50% 15.70% 21.50% 22.40% 10.90% 
2016 43.80% 17.50% 13.10% 16.60% 9% 
2017H1 42.50% 16.10% 11.70% 15% 14.70% 
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Annex 10: Trust sector assets in China 
 
 infrastructure real estate 
non-
financial 
enterprises 
bond market stock market financial institutions others 
2010 32.00% 21.00% 11.00% 8.00% 7.00% 3.00% 18.00% 
2011 21.00% 12.00% 14.00% 11.00% 9.00% 11.00% 22.00% 
2012 22.00% 13.00% 22.00% 10.00% 4.00% 10.00% 19.00% 
2013 23.00% 11.00% 25.00% 9.00% 4.00% 11.00% 17.00% 
2014 20.00% 11.00% 21.00% 9.00% 9.00% 13.00% 17.00% 
2015 19.00% 10.00% 20.00% 10.00% 11.00% 13.00% 17.00% 
2016 18.00% 11.00% 22.00% 11.00% 4.00% 18.00% 16.00% 
2017H1 17.00% 11.00% 23.00% 9.00% 5.00% 18.00% 17.00% 
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Annex 11: Investment receivables of major traditional banks in China (investment 
receivables as % of total assets) 
 
 
total 26 listed 
banks 
state-own 
bank 
joint-stock 
bank regional bank 
2015H2 8.00% 2.00% 20.00% 18.00% 
2016H1 9.00% 1.80% 21.00% 22.00% 
2016H2 7.90% 2.10% 18.00% 21.00% 
2017H1 8.00% 2.00% 17.00% 22.00% 
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Annex 12: Insurers’ investments in China(as % of insurers investments) 
 
 bank deposits bonds 
equties and 
investments 
funds 
other investments 
2015 22.00% 37.00% 11.00% 30.00% 
2016 19.00% 38.00% 10.00% 33.00% 
2017 17.00% 36.00% 9.00% 38.00% 
 
